Dan Fragiadakis is an experimental economist with a strong background in matching theory. His JM paper, joint with Pete Troyan (about whom I'll blog tomorrow), is an experiment on matching: Specifically, it deals with the issue where objects are allocated to agents without the use of money (such as school slots to students, teaching assignments at TFA to applicants, houses to college students, or trips abroad to MBA's at many business schools). Their main point is that while market designers have in the past promoted strategy-proof mechanisms, in some environments non-strategyproof mechanisms (such as the one employed by Stanford GSB) may yield superior outcomes not only in theory but also in experiments.This suggests that we should reopen the debate, as market designers, on the use of non-strategyproof mechanisms.
Dan has, next to his JM paper which is an experiment on matching, one more experimental paper (joint with me and Dan Knoeplfe, another Stanford grad student), and two theory papers on matching, one of which is the paper that Pete Troyan uses as his JM paper. I'll blog about Pete Troyan tomorrow.