In the new issue of JPSP there is an interesting article by Kate A. Ratliff and Shigehiro Oishi "Gender Differences in Implicit Self-Esteem Following a Romantic Partner’s Success or Failure"
The abstract reads
This research examined the influence of a romantic partner’s success or failure on one’s own implicit and explicit self-esteem. In Experiment 1, men had lower implicit self-esteem when their partner did well at a “social intelligence” task than when their partner did poorly. Women’s implicit self-esteem was unaffected by partner performance. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that Dutch men’s implicit self-esteem was negatively affected by their romantic partner’s success. In Experiment 4, we replicated Experiments 1–3 in both the academic and social domains, and in Experiment 5, we demonstrated that men’s implicit self-esteem is negatively influenced by thinking about a romantic partner’s success both when the success is relative and when it is not. In sum, men’s implicit self-esteem is lower when a partner succeeds than when a partner fails, whereas women’s implicit self-esteem is not. These gender differences have important implications for understanding social comparison in romantic relationships.
Most of their results are only present in an Implicit Association Task, and not in explicit measures of self-esteem, here is one of their typical figures.
This blog is to help me remember stories and papers and provide ideas for students taking the Behavioral and Experimental class. It will focus on behavioral and experimental economics, with the occasional gender story.
Thursday, October 31, 2013
Wednesday, October 30, 2013
New Publishing Practices in Psychology
Luke Coffman pointed me to the following: "What’s New at Psychological Science
An Interview with Editor in Chief Eric Eich"
One big thing is Enhanced Reporting on Methods, which includes something like:
For each study reported in your manuscript, check the boxes below to:
(1) Confirm that (a) the total number of excluded observations and (b) the reasons for doing so have been reported in the Method section(s) [ ]. If no observations were excluded, check here [ ].
(2) Confirm that all independent variables or manipulations, whether successful or failed, have been reported in the Method section(s) [ ]. If there were no independent variables or manipulations, as in the case of correlational research, check here [ ].
(3) Confirm that all dependent variables or measures that were analyzed for this article’s target research question have been reported in the Method section(s) [ ].
(4) Confirm (a) how sample size was determined and (b) your data-collection stopping rule have been reported in the Method section(s) [ ] and provide the page number(s) on which this information appears in your manuscript:
Then they go on
"Several points merit attention. First, as shown above, the four-item Disclosure Statement applies only “to each study reported in your manuscript.” Originally, we considered adding a fifth item covering additional studies, including pilot work, that were not mentioned in the main text but that tested the same research question. However, feedback from several sources suggested that this would open a large can of worms. To paraphrase one commentator (Leif Nelson), it is all too easy for a researcher to think that an excluded study does not count. Furthermore, this actually puts a meaningful burden on the “full disclosure” researcher. The four items in the Disclosure Statement shown above are equally easy for everyone to answer; either that information is already in the manuscript or they can go back and add it. But a potential fifth item, covering additional studies, is different. The researcher who convinces himself or herself that one or more excluded studies don’t count has now saved the hours it might take to write them up for this query. File-drawering studies is damaging, but we are not convinced that this will solve that problem. A better solution involves preregistration of study methods and analyses — an approach we also take up."
Another big item seems Promoting Open Practices. They go on
"Over the past several months, a group of 11 researchers led by Brian Nosek has been grappling with these and other issues. The result is an Open Practices document that proposes three forms of acknowledgment:
I'll be curious about their usage and success with the registry: I have blogged about similar attempts in Economics before here.
A big impetus has been work by Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn, some of which I talked about here
An Interview with Editor in Chief Eric Eich"
One big thing is Enhanced Reporting on Methods, which includes something like:
For each study reported in your manuscript, check the boxes below to:
(1) Confirm that (a) the total number of excluded observations and (b) the reasons for doing so have been reported in the Method section(s) [ ]. If no observations were excluded, check here [ ].
(2) Confirm that all independent variables or manipulations, whether successful or failed, have been reported in the Method section(s) [ ]. If there were no independent variables or manipulations, as in the case of correlational research, check here [ ].
(3) Confirm that all dependent variables or measures that were analyzed for this article’s target research question have been reported in the Method section(s) [ ].
(4) Confirm (a) how sample size was determined and (b) your data-collection stopping rule have been reported in the Method section(s) [ ] and provide the page number(s) on which this information appears in your manuscript:
Then they go on
"Several points merit attention. First, as shown above, the four-item Disclosure Statement applies only “to each study reported in your manuscript.” Originally, we considered adding a fifth item covering additional studies, including pilot work, that were not mentioned in the main text but that tested the same research question. However, feedback from several sources suggested that this would open a large can of worms. To paraphrase one commentator (Leif Nelson), it is all too easy for a researcher to think that an excluded study does not count. Furthermore, this actually puts a meaningful burden on the “full disclosure” researcher. The four items in the Disclosure Statement shown above are equally easy for everyone to answer; either that information is already in the manuscript or they can go back and add it. But a potential fifth item, covering additional studies, is different. The researcher who convinces himself or herself that one or more excluded studies don’t count has now saved the hours it might take to write them up for this query. File-drawering studies is damaging, but we are not convinced that this will solve that problem. A better solution involves preregistration of study methods and analyses — an approach we also take up."
Another big item seems Promoting Open Practices. They go on
"Over the past several months, a group of 11 researchers led by Brian Nosek has been grappling with these and other issues. The result is an Open Practices document that proposes three forms of acknowledgment:
- Open Data badge, which is earned for making publicly available the digitally shareable data necessary to reproduce the reported result.
- Open Materials badge, which is earned for making publicly available the digitally shareable materials/methods necessary to reproduce the reported results.
- Preregistered badge, which is earned for having a preregistered design and analysis plan for the reported research and reporting results according to that plan. An analysis plan includes specification of the variables and the analyses that will be conducted. Preregistration is an effective countermeasure to the file-drawer problem alluded to earlier in connection with Disclosure Statements.
The criteria for each badge — and the processes by which they are awarded — are described in the Open Practices document along with answers to frequently asked questions. The document proposes two ways for certifying organizations to award badges for individual studies: disclosure or peer review. For now, PS will follow the simpler disclosure method.
Manuscripts accepted for publication on or after 1 January, 2014, are eligible to earn any or all of the three aforementioned badges. Journal staff will contact the corresponding authors with details on the badge-awarding process.
Psychological Science is the first journal to implement the badge program, so changes are sure to come as editors and authors gain experience with it in the field. Again, I welcome comments and suggestions for improvement from our community."
I'll be curious about their usage and success with the registry: I have blogged about similar attempts in Economics before here.
A big impetus has been work by Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn, some of which I talked about here
Monday, October 28, 2013
How to get answers to loaded questions
My former student Luke Coffman has a new paper joint with Katie Coffman and Keith Ericson on "The Size of the LGBT Population and the Magnitude of Anti-Gay Sentiment are Substantially Underestimated"
The abstract reads:
Measuring sexual orientation, behavior, and related opinions is difficult because responses are biased towards socially acceptable answers. We test whether measurements are biased even when responses are private and anonymous and use our results to identify sexuality-related norms and how they vary. We run an experiment on 2,516 U.S. participants. Participants were randomly assigned to either a “best practices method” that was computer-based and provides privacy and anonymity, or to a “veiled elicitation method” that further conceals individual responses. Answers in the veiled method preclude inference about any particular individual, but can be used to accurately estimate statistics about the population. Comparing the two methods shows sexuality-related questions receive biased responses even under current best practices, and, for many questions, the bias is substantial. The veiled method increased self-reports of non-heterosexual identity by 65% (p<0.05) and same-sex sexual experiences by 59% (p<0.01). The veiled method also increased the rates of anti-gay sentiment. Respondents were 67% more likely to express disapproval of an openly gay manager at work (p<0.01) and 71% more likely to say it is okay to discriminate against lesbian, gay, or bisexual individuals (p<0.01).The results show non-heterosexuality and anti-gay sentiment are substantially underestimated in existing surveys, and the privacy afforded by current best practices is not always sufficient to eliminate bias. Finally, our results identify two social norms: it is perceived as socially undesirable both to be open about being gay, and to be unaccepting of gay individuals.
The abstract reads:
Measuring sexual orientation, behavior, and related opinions is difficult because responses are biased towards socially acceptable answers. We test whether measurements are biased even when responses are private and anonymous and use our results to identify sexuality-related norms and how they vary. We run an experiment on 2,516 U.S. participants. Participants were randomly assigned to either a “best practices method” that was computer-based and provides privacy and anonymity, or to a “veiled elicitation method” that further conceals individual responses. Answers in the veiled method preclude inference about any particular individual, but can be used to accurately estimate statistics about the population. Comparing the two methods shows sexuality-related questions receive biased responses even under current best practices, and, for many questions, the bias is substantial. The veiled method increased self-reports of non-heterosexual identity by 65% (p<0.05) and same-sex sexual experiences by 59% (p<0.01). The veiled method also increased the rates of anti-gay sentiment. Respondents were 67% more likely to express disapproval of an openly gay manager at work (p<0.01) and 71% more likely to say it is okay to discriminate against lesbian, gay, or bisexual individuals (p<0.01).The results show non-heterosexuality and anti-gay sentiment are substantially underestimated in existing surveys, and the privacy afforded by current best practices is not always sufficient to eliminate bias. Finally, our results identify two social norms: it is perceived as socially undesirable both to be open about being gay, and to be unaccepting of gay individuals.
Saturday, October 26, 2013
Academic fraud
The Economist has a nice article on a different type of academic fraud: "Looks Good on Paper". I guess we all got "invitations" to present our work in Economics and everything else style conferences, here is how to push that further...
"these criminals were producing something more intellectual: fake scholarly articles which they sold to academics, and counterfeit versions of existing medical journals in which they sold publication slots.
As China tries to take its seat at the top table of global academia, the criminal underworld has seized on a feature in its research system: the fact that research grants and promotions are awarded on the basis of the number of articles published, not on the quality of the original research. This has fostered an industry of plagiarism, invented research and fake journals that Wuhan University estimated in 2009 was worth $150m, a fivefold increase on just two years earlier."
They cite a study from PNAS:
Ferric C. Fang R. Grant Steen, and Arturo Casadevall, "Misconduct accounts for the majority of retracted scientiļ¬c publications"
Their abstract includes:
"A detailed review of all 2,047 biomedical and life-science research articles indexed by PubMed as retracted on May 3, 2012 revealed that only 21.3% of retractions were attributable to error. In contrast, 67.4% of retractions were attributable to misconduct, including fraud or suspected fraud (43.4%), duplicate publication (14.2%), and plagiarism (9.8%)."
The main picture is
"these criminals were producing something more intellectual: fake scholarly articles which they sold to academics, and counterfeit versions of existing medical journals in which they sold publication slots.
As China tries to take its seat at the top table of global academia, the criminal underworld has seized on a feature in its research system: the fact that research grants and promotions are awarded on the basis of the number of articles published, not on the quality of the original research. This has fostered an industry of plagiarism, invented research and fake journals that Wuhan University estimated in 2009 was worth $150m, a fivefold increase on just two years earlier."
They cite a study from PNAS:
Ferric C. Fang R. Grant Steen, and Arturo Casadevall, "Misconduct accounts for the majority of retracted scientiļ¬c publications"
Their abstract includes:
"A detailed review of all 2,047 biomedical and life-science research articles indexed by PubMed as retracted on May 3, 2012 revealed that only 21.3% of retractions were attributable to error. In contrast, 67.4% of retractions were attributable to misconduct, including fraud or suspected fraud (43.4%), duplicate publication (14.2%), and plagiarism (9.8%)."
The main picture is
Friday, October 25, 2013
ESA in Santa Cruz
The next two days: ESA Santa Cruz!
Below is the progam
Below is the progam
October 24, 5:30 - 8:00 pm
- Welcome Reception, Hotel Paradox
- Registration Desk Open, Hotel Paradox
Friday, October 25, 8:00 am -9:00 am
Plenary Session: Rachel Croson, University of Texas Arlington, "Experimental Economics Imperialism"
Chair: Tim Cason
Chair: Tim Cason
Friday, October 25, 7:30 am - 6:30 pm
Registration Desk Open, Hotel Paradox
Paradox Breakfast Buffet, Solaire Restaurant, 6:30 - 8:30 am
Paradox Lunch Buffet, Solaire Restaurant, 12:00 - 1:20 pm
Paradox Breakfast Buffet, Solaire Restaurant, 6:30 - 8:30 am
Paradox Lunch Buffet, Solaire Restaurant, 12:00 - 1:20 pm
Friday, October 25, 9am - 6:00 pm
Experimental Software and Hardware Demos, Hotel Paradox
- Table 1: Driving Simulator, Lisa Rutstrom
- Table 2: MobLab: interactive markets and games on mobile devices, Walter Yuan and Rachel Bodsky
Friday, October 25, 9:20am - 10:20am
Session 1, Sequoia A: Auctions: Bidding Behavior
- Anmol Ratan, Does anticipated loss-aversion explain overbidding in first-price auctions?
- Shang Wu, The Willingness-to-Pay Discrepancy between Incentive Compatible Auctions and Posted Price Offerings
- Theodore Turocy, Bidding behavior in affiliated-values first-price auctions
Session 2, Sequoia B: Conflict and Contests
- Roman Sheremeta, Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution
- William Ingersoll, Agent Bargaining
- Charles Holt, An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining
Session 3, Sequoia C: Games: Sophistication and Expertise
- Tobias Salz, Estimating Dynamic Games of Oligopolistic Competition: An Experimental Investigation
- Natalia Mishagina, COORDINATION, COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND AN H1N1 OUTBREAK
- John Wooders, Blind Stealing: Experience and Expertise in a Mixed-Strategy Poker Experiment
Session 4, Sequoia D: Market Design 1
- Ahrash Dianat, Experiments on Strategic Behavior and Equilibrium Selection in Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Ming Jiang, An Experimental Study of Chinese College Admissions
- Judd Kessler, An Experimental Test of a Complex Market Design: Changing the Course Allocation System at Wharton
Session 5, Grove: Risk Preference
- Salar Jahedi, The Role of Information in Explaining Decoy Effects
- Marina Schroder, Dictating the Risk
- James Andreoni, Unexpected Utility: Testing Expected Utility and Its Alternatives using Convex Risk Budgets
Session 6, Cypress: Interpersonal Influence
- Dietmar Fehr, Talking about others: Gossip as a means to increase trust and cooperation
- Marco Kleine, Fairness and Persuasion - How Stakeholders' Statements influence Third-Party Distribution
- Lucas Coffman, Interpersonal Influence
Session 7, Fitness Center: Cooperation and Institutions 2
- David Kingsley, Endowment Heterogeneity and Informal Sanctions in a Public Goods Experiment
- Claudia Keser, Cooperation among heterogeneous agents
- Martin Schmidt, Cooperation and punishment among heterogeneous agents
Friday, October 25, 10:40am - 12:00pm
Session 1, Sequoia A: Decision Making Under Ambiguity
- Charles Sprenger, On Measuring Ambiguity Aversion
- Oscar Zapata, The effect of ambiguity on preferences over gains and losses: Experimental evidence
- Alex Roomets, Unintended Hedging in Ambiguity Experiments
- Yoram Halevy, No Two Experiments are Identical
Session 2, Sequoia B: Repeated Games 1
- Kenju Kamei, Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games
- Lijia Tan, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Played over an Infinite HorizonVoluntary Contribution Mechanism Played over an Infinite Horizon Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Played over an Infinite Horizon
- Sean D'Evelyn, Dump, Date, or Marry: Endogenous Group Formation with Varied Contract Length
- Jan Potters, Flexibility and collusion with imperfect monitoring
Session 3, Sequoia C: Finance 1
- Jens Schubert, Creating Bubbles Out of Thin Air: The Effect of Biased Reward Functions on Price Convergence and Volatility
- Oege Dijk, Bank Run Psychology
- Anya (Savikhin) Samak, Effect of Visual Representation and Experience on Asset Market Bubbles
- Shengle Lin, Marked to Market Accounting and Financial Market Instability: Experimental Evidence
Session 4, Sequoia D: Belief Formation
- Eric Cardella, The Impact of Variance and Skewness of Court Awards on Eminent Domain
- Stephanie Heger, Performance Uncertainty and Optimistic Beliefs
- Justin Rao, Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Ideological Segregation in Online News Consumption
- Philip Brookins, Reducing within-group overconfidence through group identity and between-groups confidence judgements
Session 5, Grove: Environmental 1
- Hernan Bejarano, Do Cab Drivers Charge for Congestion? A Traffic Field Experiment in Lima, Peru
- Dina Tasneem, An Experimental Study of a Common Property Renewable Resource Game in Continuous Time
- Rami Harb, Driving Responses and Opinions: How Do Drivers React to Road Pricing?
Session 6, Cypress: Bargaining (Behavioral)
- Georg Primes, It's not all in the face - Misjudging your opponents in competitive bargaining.
- Johannes Jaschke, I see you, you see me: how perceived facial dominance and trustworthiness influence bargaining behavior.
- Kristian Lopez Vargas, The Demand for Expressing Emotions
- Theo Offerman, In Search of the Angry Button
Session 7, Fitness Center: Cooperation and Institutions 1
- Eric Dickson, Legitimate Authority, Procedural Fairness, and Communication: A Public Goods Experiment
- Dimitry Mezhvinsky, Boycotting and Buycotting: Third-Party Punishment and Reward in Groups
- Tobias Cagala, Cooperation under Third-Party Rent Extraction
- E Lance Howe, To punish or withhold? Implicit versus explicit sanctions in a risky social dilemma: evidence from Kamchatka, Russia.
Friday, October 25, 1:20pm - 2:40pm
Session 1, Sequoia A: Networks
- Arya Gaduh, The Strategic Formation of Networks: Experimental Evidence
- David Rojo Arjona, Centrality, Control and Exclusion in Network Social Dilemmas
- Julian Romero, Hysteresis of Network Formation
- Rong Rong, Growing the Right Stars: A Laboratory Study on Network Formation with Heterogeneous Agents
Session 2, Sequoia B: Repeated Games 2
- Guillaume Frechette, The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private
- Siqian Zhu, A Comment on Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment
- Ajalavat Viriyavipart, Testing Global Games, Risk Dominance, and Payoff Dominance in Repeated Global Stag Hunt Games
- John Ledyard, Repeated Battle of Sexes: Experimental Evidence and Individual Evolutionary Learning
Session 3, Sequoia C: Finance 2
- Tomoki Kitamura, An Experimental Analysis of Bubble: Private Information and Trading Behavior
- Michael McBride, Limelight on Dark Markets: An Experimental Study of Liquidity and Information
- Isabel Trevino, Understanding the channels of financial contagion: Theory and experiments
Session 4, Sequoia D: Special Session: Pay Protocols
- James C. Cox, Paradoxes and Mechanisms for Choice under Risk
- Yoram Halevy, Elicitation of Risk and Uncertainty Preferences
- Paul Healy, Incentives in Experiments: The RPS Mechanism
Session 5, Grove: Environmental 2
- Jacob Fooks, Experiments in Environmental Service Provisioning Mechanisms with Spatially Explicit Externalities: An Application in Coastal Infrastructure
- Christopher Anderson, Evaluating Common Pools to Mitigate Shutdown and Market Risk in Multi-output Quota Markets with Stochastic Production Ratios
- James Murphy, Price Controls and Banking in Emissions Trading Programs
Session 6, Cypress: Labor 1
- John Hamman, Dependency Status and Preferences for Social Insurance
- Laura Gee, The More You Know: How Information affects job search in a large field experiment
- Tracy Liu, Right Contract for Right Workers? Survey and Experimental Evidence
- Mongoljin Batsaikhan, Trust, Trustworthiness, and Success in Business
Session 7, Fitness Center: Beliefs and Others Behavior
- Yun Wang, An Experimental Investigation on Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games
- Alison Sanchez, An Experimental Analysis of the Cognitive Processes Underlying Beliefs and Perception Manipulation
- Jeffrey Butler, Inequality and Relative Ability Beliefs
- Erik Kimbrough, Theory of Mind: Theory and Experiment
Friday, October 25, 3:00pm - 4:20pm
Session 1, Sequoia A: Cooperation and Institutions 3
- Alexander Smith, Investing in Institutions for Cooperation
- Brock Stoddard, Uncertainty in Payoff-Equivalent Appropriation and Provision Games
- Menusch Khadjavi, Setting the Bar - An Experimental Investigation of Immigration Requirements
- Qilin Zhang, Punishment with Uncertainty in Public Goods Experiment
Session 2, Sequoia B: Repeated Games 3
- Andrew Kloosterman, Cooperation in Stochastically Evolving Environments: An Experimental Study of Public Information in Markov Games
- Steven Wu, Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: Theory and Experiments
- Kyle Hyndman, An Experimental Investigation into the Success or Failure of Joint Ventures
Session 3, Sequoia C: Industrial Organization 1
- Vjollca Sadiraj, Higher Quality and Lower Cost from Improving Hospital Discharge Decision Making
- Matt Goldman, Experiments as Insturments: Understanding Consumer Behavior in Sponsored Search
Session 4, Sequoia D: Biased Beliefs
- Adam Sanjurjo, A Cold Shower for the Hot Hand Fallacy
- Sandro Ambuehl, Consistent Individual Deviations from Bayesian Belief Updating and the Demand for Information
- Dominik Duell, Attribution Bias in Strategic Environments
- Olga Bogach, Luck, entitlement, and redistribution: experimental evidence
Session 5, Grove: Behavioral Finance
- Peiran Jiao, Belief in Mean Reversion and the Disposition Effect
- Jacopo Magnani, The Disposition Effect and Realization Preferences: a Direct Test
- Emel Filiz Ozbay, Do Lottery Payments Induce Savings Behavior? Evidence from the Lab
- Thomas Stephens, Nominal Loss Aversion and Individual Investment Decisions
Session 6, Cypress: Inequality and Social Preferences
- David Owens, The Source of Inequality and Preferences for Wealth Redistribution
- Maria Porter, Characterizing Preferences for Giving to Parents in an Experimental Setting: Reciprocity or Altruism
- Paulo Peneda Saraiva, Modelling Socially Responsible Investment Decisions
- Julian Jamison, Behavioral Poverty Traps and Time Preferences in Liberia
Session 7, Fitness Center: Legislative Bargaining and Committtee Behavior
- Anthony Bradfield, Legislative Bargaining with Teams
- Chloe Tergiman, Cheap-Talk, Back Room Deals and Multilateral Bargaining
- Sebastian Fehrler, How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation (And Why That May Be a Good Thing)
- Andrzej Baranski, Communication in Legislative Bargaining
Friday, October 25, 4:40pm - 6:00pm
Session 1, Sequoia A: Cooperation and Institutions 4
- J. Forrest Williams, Debt and (Future) Taxes: Financing Intergenerational Public Goods
- Rulliere Jean-Louis, Verbal Feedback and Punishment in Public Good Games.
- Fatemeh Momeni, Voluntary and Mandatory provision of Common Pool Resources with Heterogeneous appropriators
- Sara Adler, Effects of Threshold Uncertainty on Common Pool resource Depletion
Session 2, Sequoia B: Risk Preference: Social Effects
- Benjamin Enke, Cultural Persistence: The Ancient Origins of Risk Preferences
- Rudy Santore, Other Regarding Preferences and Risk Taking
- Jason Aimone, Following the Followers: The Dynamics of Risky Preferences and the Decisions of Leaders
- Luke Jones, How does origin of leadership influence risk-taking behavior of representative decision makers?
Session 3, Sequoia C: Industrial Organization 2
- Tobias Wenzel, Shrouding add-on information: an experimental study
- Xiangdong Qin, Buy-sell clause with an investigation cost
Session 4, Sequoia D: Norms
- Carrie Wenjing Xu, Harnessing the Power of Norm
- Albena Neschen, Ignorance and Ethical Behavior: Lessons from the Lab
- Meng-Chien Su, Countering Manipulation in Prediction Markets? The Role of Incentives
- Michael Kurschilgen, Follow the Crowd or Your Conscience: an Experimental Study of Norms and Social Preferences
Session 5, Grove: Labor 2
- Tai-Sen He, Overreaction or Under-reaction: How Do People Respond to Wage Changes?
- Frederic Schneider, Job Tenure as a Signal of Effort in Labor Markets with Incomplete Contracts
Session 6, Cypress: Charitable Contributions 1
- Robert Slonim, The Price of Warm Glow
- Edward Millner, Taking, Giving, and Impure Altruism in Dictator Games
- Maros Servatka, Transaction Costs and Inertia in Charitable Giving
- Wei Zhan, The Role of Volunteer Leaders in Fundraising
Session 7, Fitness Center: Voting Behavior
- Cortney Rodet, Are Political Statements Only Expressive? A Laboratory Experiment
- Anna Bassi, Weather, mood, and voting: An experimental analysis of the effect of weather beyond turnout
- Yi-Yi Chen, Getting Out the Vote: Information and Voting Behavior
- Darryl Seale, Sequential Search by Committees with Rank-dependent Payoffs: An Experimental Study
Saturday, October 26, 8:00am - 9:00am
Plenary Session:
Welcome: Sheldon Kamieniecki, Dean of Social Sciences, UCSC
Speaker: Al Roth, Stanford University, "Market Design" [tentative]
Chair: Dan Friedman
Welcome: Sheldon Kamieniecki, Dean of Social Sciences, UCSC
Speaker: Al Roth, Stanford University, "Market Design" [tentative]
Chair: Dan Friedman
Saturday, October 26, 8:00 am - 10:00 am
Registration Desk Open, Hotel Paradox
Paradox Breakfast Buffet, Solaire Restaurant, 6:30 - 8:30 am
Paradox Lunch Buffet, Solaire Restaurant, 12:00 - 1:20 pm
Paradox Breakfast Buffet, Solaire Restaurant, 6:30 - 8:30 am
Paradox Lunch Buffet, Solaire Restaurant, 12:00 - 1:20 pm
Saturday, October 26, 9am - 6:00 pm
Experimental Software and Hardware Demos, Hotel Paradox
- Table 1: Driving Simulator, Lisa Rutstrom
- Table 2: MobLab: interactive markets and games on mobile devices, Walter Yuan and Rachel Bodsky
Saturday, October 26, 9:20am - 10:20am
Session 1, Sequoia A: Learning
- Zhijian Wang, Cycle frequency in standard Rock-Paper-Scissors games: Evidence from experimental economics
- Shu Heng Chen, Heterogeneity in Experienced-Weighted Attraction Learning and Its Relation to Cognitive Ability
- John Duffy, Lone Wolf or Herd Animal? An Experiment on Choice of Information and Social Learning
Session 2, Sequoia B: Social Information 1
- Linnea Wickstrom Ostervall, Nudge nudge and say no more: How do reminders in the waiting room affect antibiotics use?
- Joseph Wang, Confucianism and Preferences: Evidence from Lab Experiments in Taiwan and China
- Carmen Wang, Blood donation registry one year on: Long term effects and the role of social information
Session 3, Sequoia C: Survey Methods: Characterizing Behavior
- Morten Lau, Characterizing Financial and Statistical Literacy
- Katherine Baldiga, The Size of the LGBT Population and the Magnitude of Anti-Gay Sentiment are Substantially Underestimated
- Andreas Blume, Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response
Session 4, Sequoia D: Gender 1
- Siyu Wang, Demanding or Deferring : Cross-cultural Gender Differences in Communication
- Jonathan Woon, Fact or Fiction? Gender and the Truthfulness of Campaign Messages
- Muriel Niederle, Gender differences in negotiation
Session 5, Grove: Market Design 2
- Daniel Fragiadakis, Behavioral Market Design: Improving Welfare on Focal--Rather than Equilibrium--Paths
- Tingting Ding, Matching and Chatting: An Experimental Study of the Impact of Network Communication on School-Matching Mechanisms
- Pablo Guillen, Lying through Their Teeth: Third Party Advice and Truth Telling in a Strategy Proof Mechanism
Session 6, Cypress: Charity 2
- Luigi Butera, Good News, Bad News, and Social Image: The Market for Charitable Giving
- Zach Grossman, Dual-Process Reasoning and Giving Behavior
- Alexander Brown, Substitutes vs. Compliments in Charitable Donations
Session 7, Fitness Center: Dynamic Choice
- Linda Thunstrom, Strategic Self-Ignorance
- Ryan Oprea, Time and State Dependence in an Ss Decision Experiment
- Emanuel Vespa, Markov Strategies: An Experimental Test
Saturday, October 26, 10:40am - 12:00pm
Session 1, Sequoia A: Spatial Interactions
- Curtis Kephart, Hotelling in Continuous Time and Action Spaces
- Laurent Denant-Boemont, Why Central Paris is Rich and Downtown Detroit is Poor: A Laboratory Experiment
- Sabrina Hammiche, Urban Costs and the Spatial Structure of Cities: A Laboratory Experiment
Session 2, Sequoia B: Social Information 2
- Sara Elisa Kettner, Social Information and Contribution Behavior: On the Malleability of Climate Change Mitigation Preferences
- Clayton Featherstone, Can Subtle Provision of Social Information Affect What Job You Choose (and Keep)? Experimental Evidence from Teach For America
- Oliver Himmler, Tax Evasion Spillovers
- Tanya Rosenblat, Social Coupons: Mechanism Design for Social Media
Session 3, Sequoia C: Lab to Field 1
- Chenna Reddy Cotla, On Measuring the Preferences of the Poor
- Ellen Green, Counterfactual Simulations in Experimental Economics: A Study of Blended Physician Payment Structures
- Urmimala Sen, Caste, Efficiency and Fairness with Public Goods and Common Pool Resources
Session 4, Sequoia D: Gender 2
- Qiyan Ong, When do Women Compete with Men? Gender Differences in Competitive Behaviour in an Investment Decision Experiment
- Mariah Ehmke, Young Consumer's Demand for Natural Sweeteners
- Anne Preston, Do Differences in Willingness to Compete in Laboratory Experiments Explain Gender Differences in Labor Market Outcomes
- John Ifcher, Exploring gender differences in preferences over competition using switch points and relative payoffs
Session 5, Grove: Firm Behavior 1
- Giuseppe Danese, Trustees and agents in corporate governance
- Enrique Fatas, Money Illusion and Price Competition
- Miguel Martinez, Optimal Organizational Response: An Experimental Study of Firm Structure
Session 6, Cypress: Lies and Deception
- Lilia Zhurakhovska, Truth or Guilt: Theory and Experiments on Lying in Games
- Jingnan Chen, Broken Promises and Hidden Partnership: Theory and Experiment
- Merve Akbas, An experimental study on dishonesty: The effect of ambiguity and framing
- Quoc Tran, Lying to catch up, or lying to keep up
Session 7, Fitness Center: Tournaments and Contests 1
- Annika Mueller, Incentive Substitutability and Heterogenous Motives in an Innovation Contest - Field Experimental Evidence
- Lian Jian, Competing Openly or Blindly in Crowdsourcing Contests?
- Tim Salmon, Managing Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments
Saturday, October 26, 1:20pm - 2:40pm
Session 1, Sequoia A: Cooperation and Institutions 5
- Malcolm Kass, Effects of Endogenous Selection of Nested PD games on Pro-social behavior and outcomes
- Anna Lou Abatayo, Does external regulation crowd out cooperation?
- Fangfang Tan, Justification and Legitimate Punishment
- Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Second Thought: Theory and Experiment in Social Dilemma
Session 2, Sequoia B: Experimental Methodology
- Kory Garner, Game Form Representation and Knowledge Spillovers
- Linda Kamas, Capture vs. Recruitment of Subjects in Experiments Measuring Social Preferences
- Tamas Csermely, A Comprehensive Comparison of Risk Elicitation Methods
- Elisabet Rutstrom, Measuring Risk Aversion to Guide Policy Naturalistic Tasks and Respondents
Session 3, Sequoia C: Social Preferences 1
- Xiaofei (Sophia) Pan, It's Not just the thought that counts --- An experimental study on hidden cost of giving
- Gustavo Caballero, Inequality of Opportunities and Redistribution: an Experiment
- Cheng-Tse Lin, Other-regarding Preferences in Experimental Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemmas
- Garret Ridinger, Benefit of the doubt: the importance of intentions and control in cooperation
Session 4, Sequoia D: Time Preferences
- Younjun Kim, Testing time preference elicitation methods with multiple-price-list format
- Geoffrey Fisher, The Role of Attention in Intertemporal Choices
- Jeffrey Naecker, Demand for Commitment: Time Inconsistency or Signaling?
- Michael Kuhn, The Unforeseen Benefits of EBT: What Can They Tell Us About Dynamic Inconsistency?
Session 5, Grove: Strategic Sophistication
- Qiqi Cheng, An attention-based stationary concepts for Experimental 2x2-Games
- Ryan Kendall, Decomposing Bounded Rationality and Behavioral Models
- Daniel Martin, Failures of Unraveling in Disclosure Experiments: A Level-K Analysis
Session 6, Cypress: Gender and Stereotypes
- Teodora Boneva, Parental socialisation effort and the intergenerational transmission of risk preferences
- Anat Bracha, Affirmative Action and Stereotype Threat
- Jue Wang, Income attraction: An online dating field experiment
- Edward Asiedu, Gender, Age and Norm Enforcement: Evidence From a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society
Session 7, Fitness Center: Tournaments and Contests 2
- Zhengzheng Wang, Externalities in the Colonel Blotto Game
- Glenn Dutcher, Do contests bring out the worst in us or the worst among us?
- Cary Deck, An Experimental Investigation of Simultaneous Multi-battle Contests with Complementarities
Session 8, Poolside: Preferences and Behavior
- Klajdi Bregu, The Impact of Overconfidence in Acquiring Information
- Erin Fairweather, Small Stakes Risk Aversion and the Endowment Effect
- Sean Crockett, Eliciting Preferences with Rank-ordered? Choices
- Ben Greiner, How individual preferences get aggregated in groups - An experimental study
Saturday, October 26, 3:00pm - 4:20pm
Session 1, Sequoia A: Coordination
- Daniel Saunders, Noisy best response in coordination games: strategic vs. payoff uncertainty
- Ulrich Glogowsky, Cooperation and Trustworthiness in a repeated Interaction
- Doru Cojoc, Prominence and Leadership in a Minimum Effort Game
- Ernesto Reuben, Competition, cooperation, and collective choice
Session 2, Sequoia B: Lab to Field 2
- Catherine Porter, Charitable Dictators? Elite Attitudes in a Developing Country Context
- Tushi Baul, Social norms about bribe-giving and bribe-taking in India
- Angelino Viceisza, Coordination games with farmer groups: Experimental evidence from Senegal
- Natalia Candelo Londono, Advice and Herding: An Artefactual Field Experiment with Current and Potential Immigrants
Session 3, Sequoia C: Social Preferences 2
- Clay McManus, Signaling Smarts: Revealed Preferences for Self and Social Perceptions of Intelligence
- Erik Kimbrough, Norms Make Preferences Social
- Johanna Mollerstrom, Luck, choice and responsibility - an experimental investigation of distributive justice
- Severine Toussaert, Costly Signalling of Intentions in the Trust Game
Session 4, Sequoia D: Charitable Contributions 2
- Ericka Scherenberg Farret, A Finite Mixture of Behaviors in the Care Game
- Svetlana Pevnitskaya, The effect of feedback on performance of charity auctions.
- Adrian Stoian, You Think You Are Bad? That's (Also) An Asset
Session 5, Grove: Experiments in Development
- Urmimala Sen, Dictates, Ultimatums and Spousal Empowerment in Rural India
- Laura Munro, Insurance structure, risk-sharing and investment choices: an empirical investigation
Session 6, Cypress: Macroeconomics
- Ciril Bosch-Rosa, Banking Networks and Information Processing
- Andreas Markstaedter, Informational Asymmetries in Laboratory Asset Markets with State Dependent Fundamentals
- Jack Rogers, How Does Transparency Affect Emergent Equilibria in Large Online Macroeconomic Environments?
- Luba Petersen, Asset Trading and Monetary Policy in Production Economies
Session 7, Fitness Center: Auctions: Institutions
- Michael Caldara, Auctions with Tokens
- Joshua Foster, Theory and Experiments on Bidding Behavior in the Bucket Auction
- Katerina Sherstyuk, Auctions or Contests? Resource allocation under strategic uncertainty
Saturday, October 26, 4:40pm - 6:00pm
Session 1, Sequoia A: Communication and Cooperation
- David Goldbaum, Follow the leader with a 2-stage decision model
- Simon Gaechter, The ABC of Cooperation and Framing Effects in Social Dilemmas
- Orsola Garofalo, Spokesperson - to be or not to be?
- Tim Cason, Participation and Spatial Coordination in Conservation Incentive Schemes: The Role of Transaction Costs and Communication
Session 2, Sequoia B: Lab to Field 3
- Catherine Weinberger, Dictator Game Generosity and Real World Outcomes
- Danila Serra, Does competition among public officials reduce corruption? An experiment
- Sheheryar Banuri, Intrinsic Motivation, Effort, and the Call to Public Service
- Alessandra Cassar, Monetary Incentives and Support Groups Help People Help Themselves: A Field Experiment
Session 3, Sequoia C: Social Preferences 3
- Seung Ginny Choi, Markets and the emergence of social relationships: A Laboratory Experiment
- Sevgi Yuksel, When is inequality Fair? An experiment on the effect of procedural justice and agency
- Xiaoyuan Wang, Social Preferences in Exploding Offers
- Brit Grosskopf, The Effects of Anger and Happiness on Pro-Social Behaviour
Session 4, Sequoia D: New Data: Inference from Decision Times
- David Dickinson, The impact of glucose administration on Bayesian v. heuristic based choice
- Maria Recalde, Intuitive generosity and error prone inference from decision time
- John Clithero, Combining Response Times and Choice Data Using a Neuroeconomic Model of the Decision Process Improves Out-of-Sample Predictions
- Ryan Webb, Rationalizing Context-Dependent Preferences: Divisive Normalization and Neural Constraints on Decision-Making
Session 5, Grove: Reference Dependent Preferences
- Sally Sadoff, Do people anticipate loss aversion
- Jens Schubert, Uncertainty and the WTA-WTP Disparity for Private and Public Goods
- Erik Wengstrom, Deciding for Others Reduces Loss Aversion
- Christine Exley, Examining when Reference Points Lead to Negative Wage Elasticities in Work and Volunteer Tasks
Session 6, Cypress: Trust and Trustworthiness
- Walter Theseira, Is a Picture Really Worth a Thousand Words? Investigating the Relative Value of Appearances in an Investment Experiment
- Eric Schniter, Ageism & Cooperation
- Markus Noth, Financial Information and Advice
- Benjamin Ho, Trust and Contracts: An Experimental Study
Session 7, Fitness Center: Auctions: Incentives
- Daniel Stephenson, Social Learning in Continuous-Time All-Pay Auctions
- Andrew Brownback, Curved or Twisted: Incentive Effects of Proportional Grading, and Other Consequences of All-Pay Auctions
- Marco Palma, Modeling Unobserved Consumer Heterogeneity in Experimental Auctions: A Censored Random Parameters Approach
- Li Hao, An Experimental Investigation of Procurement Auctions with Asymmetric Sellers
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